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Abstract
Rekeying refers to an operation of replacing an existing key with a new key for encryption. It re-
news security protection, so as to protect against key compromise and enable dynamic access control
in cryptographic storage. However, it is non-trivial to realize efficient rekeying in encrypted deduplica-
tion storage systems, which use deterministic content-derived encryption keys to allow deduplication on
ciphertexts. We design and implement REED, a rekeying-aware encrypted deduplication storage sys-
tem. REED builds on a deterministic version of all-or-nothing transform (AONT), such that it enables
secure and lightweight rekeying, while preserving the deduplication capability. We propose two REED
encryption schemes that trade between performance and security, and extend REED for dynamic ac-
cess control. We implement a REED prototype with various performance optimization techniques and
demonstrate how we can exploit similarity to mitigate key generation overhead. Our trace-driven testbed
evaluation shows that our REED prototype maintains high performance and storage efficiency.
1 Introduction
Data explosion has raised a scalability challenge to cloud storage management. For example, Aberdeen
Research [24] reports that the average size of backup data for a medium-size enterprise is 285TB, and
meanwhile, faces an annual growth rate of about 24-27%. Deduplication is one plausible solution that makes
storage management scalable. Its idea is to eliminate the storage of redundant messages that have identical
content, by keeping only one message copy and referring other redundant messages to the copy through
small-size pointers. Deduplication is shown to effectively reduce storage space for some workloads, such
as backup data [64]. It has also been deployed in today’s commercial cloud storage services (e.g., Dropbox,
Google Drive, Bitcasa, Mozy, and Memopal) for saving maintenance costs [36].
To protect against content leakage of outsourced data, cloud users often want to store encrypted data
in the cloud. Traditional symmetric encryption is incompatible with deduplication: it assumes that users
encrypt messages with their own distinct keys, and hence identical messages of different users will lead to
distinct ciphertexts and prohibit deduplication. Bellare et al. [14] define a cryptographic primitive called
message-locked encryption (MLE), which derives the encryption key from the message itself through a
uniform derivation function, so that the same message deterministically returns the same ciphertext through
symmetric encryption. One well-known instantiation of MLE is convergent encryption (CE) [28], which
uses the cryptographic hash of the message content as the derivation function. Storage systems that realize
CE or MLE have been extensively studied and evaluated in the literature (e.g., [4, 6, 13, 23, 61, 67]). We
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collectively refer to them as encrypted deduplication storage systems, which encrypt the stored data while
preserving the deduplication capability.
However, existing encrypted deduplication storage systems do not address rekeying, an operation that
replaces an existing key with a new key so as to renew security protection. Rekeying is critical not only for
protecting against key compromise that has been witnessed in real-life accidents [25, 40, 63], but also for
enabling dynamic access control to revoke unauthorized users from accessing data in cryptographic storage
[10, 30, 39, 51]. However, realizing efficient rekeying in encrypted deduplication storage is challenging.
Since the encryption key of each message in MLE is obtained from a deterministic derivation function
(e.g., a hash function), if we renew the key by renewing the derivation function, any newly stored message
encrypted by the new key can no longer be deduplicated with the existing identical message; if we re-
encrypt all existing messages with the new key obtained from the renewed derivation function, there will be
tremendous performance overheads for processing large quantities of messages.
This paper presents REED, a rekeying-aware encrypted deduplication storage system that aims for se-
cure and lightweight rekeying, while preserving identical content for deduplication. REED augments MLE
with the idea of all-or-nothing transform (AONT) [56], which transforms a secret into a package, such that
the secret cannot be recovered without knowing the entire package. REED constructs a package based on
a deterministic variant of AONT [43] and encrypts a small part of the package with a key that is subject
to rekeying, while the remaining large part of the package still preserves identical content for deduplica-
tion. We show that this approach enables secure and lightweight rekeying, and simultaneously maintains
deduplication effectiveness. The contributions of this paper are summarized as follows.
• We propose two encryption schemes for REED, namely basic and enhanced, that trade between per-
formance and security. Both schemes enable lightweight rekeying, while the enhanced scheme is
resilient against key leakage through a more expensive encryption than the basic scheme.
• We extend REED with dynamic access control. We demonstrate how REED integrates existing primi-
tives, namely ciphertext-policy attribute-based encryption (CP-ABE) [15] and key regression [30], so
as to control the access privileges to different files.
• We exploit the similarity property that is commonly found in backup workloads [17] to mitigate the
overhead of MLE key generation, while preserving deduplication effectiveness.
• We implement a proof-of-concept REED prototype. Our REED prototype leverages various perfor-
mance optimization techniques to mitigate both computational and I/O overheads.
• We conduct extensive trace-driven evaluation on our REED prototype in a LAN testbed. REED shows
lightweight rekeying. It only takes 3.4s to re-encrypt an 8GB file with a new key (in active revocation),
and maintains high storage saving (e.g., higher than 97%) in real-world datasets. We also demonstrate
the effectiveness of exploiting similarity in mitigating key generation overhead.
The source code of our REED prototype is now available for download at the following website:
http://ansrlab.cse.cuhk.edu.hk/software/reed.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 motivates the need of rekeying for encrypted
deduplication storage. Section 3 defines our threat model and security goals. Section 4 presents the design
of REED. Section 5 explains how we exploit similarity in REED to mitigate MLE key generation overhead.
Section 6 presents the implementation details of REED. Section 7 presents our evaluation results. Section 8
reviews related work, and finally, Section 9 concludes the paper.
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2 Background and Motivation
2.1 Encrypted Deduplication Storage
Deduplication exploits content similarity to achieve storage efficiency. Each message is identified by a fin-
gerprint, computed as a cryptographic hash of the content of the message. We assume that two messages are
identical (distinct) if their fingerprints are identical (distinct), and that the fingerprint collision of two distinct
messages has a negligible probability in practice [18]. Deduplication stores only one copy of identical mes-
sages, and refers any other identical message to the copy using a small-size pointer. In this paper, we focus
on chunk-level deduplication, which divides file data into fixed-size or variable-size chunks, and removes
duplicates at the granularity of chunks. We use the terms “messages” and “chunks” interchangeably to refer
to the data units operated by deduplication.
Message-locked encryption (MLE) [14] is a cryptographic primitive that provides confidentiality guar-
antees for deduplication storage. It applies symmetric encryption to encrypt a message with a key called the
MLE key that is derived from the message itself, so as to produce a deterministic ciphertext. Two identical
(distinct) messages will lead to identical (distinct) ciphertexts, so deduplication remains plausible. A special
case of MLE is convergent encryption (CE) [28], which directly uses the message’s fingerprint as the MLE
key.
However, MLE (including CE) is inherently vulnerable to brute-force attacks. Suppose that a target
message is known to be drawn from a finite space. Then an adversary can sample all messages, derive the
MLE key of each message, and compute the corresponding ciphertexts. If one of the computed ciphertexts
equals the ciphertext of the target message, then the adversary can deduce the target message. Thus, MLE
achieves security only for unpredictable messages [14], meaning that the number of candidate messages is
so large that the adversary cannot feasibly check all messages against the ciphertexts.
To address the unpredictability assumption, DupLESS [13] implements server-aided MLE. It uses a ded-
icated key manager to generate an MLE key for a message based on two inputs: the message’s fingerprint
and a system-wide secret that is independent of the message content. If the key manager is secure, then
the ciphertexts appear to be encrypted with the keys that are derived from a random key space. This pro-
vides confidentiality guarantees even for predictable messages. Even if the key manager is compromised,
DupLESS still achieves confidentiality for unpredictable messages. To make MLE key generation robust,
DupLESS introduces two mechanisms. First, it uses the oblivious pseudo-random function (OPRF) [32] to
“blind” a fingerprint to be processed by the key manager, such that the key manager can return the MLE key
without knowing the original fingerprint. Second, the key manager rate-limits the key generation requests
to protect against online brute-force attacks.
In this work, we focus on encrypted deduplication storage based on server-aided MLE. Like DupLESS,
we deploy a dedicated key manager that is responsible for MLE key generation, so as to be secure against
brute-force attacks.
2.2 Rekeying
We define rekeying as the generic process of updating an old key to a new key in encrypted storage, such that
the old key will be revoked, and all subsequently stored files will be encrypted by the new key. We argue
that rekeying is critical for renewing security protection for encrypted deduplication storage in two aspects:
key protection and access revocation.
Key protection: There have been real-life cases that indicate how adversaries make key compromise
plausible through various system vulnerabilities, such as design flaws [25, 40, 59] and programming errors
[63]. These threats also apply to storage systems, since adversaries can compromise file encryption keys
and recover all encrypted files. In addition to key compromise, every cryptographic key in use is associated
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with a lifetime, and needs to be replaced once the key reaches the end of its lifetime [11]. Rekeying is thus
critical for key protection. By immediately updating the compromised or expired keys, we ensure that the
stored files remain protected by the new keys.
Since deduplication implies the sharing of data across multiple files and users, rekeying in encrypted
deduplication storage is more critical than traditional encrypted storage without deduplication. In particular,
the security of a message depends on its MLE key. The leakage of the MLE key may imply the compromise
of multiple files that share the corresponding message.
Access revocation: Organizations increasingly outsource large-scale projects to cloud storage providers
for efficient management. We consider a special case in genome research. Genome researchers increasingly
leverage cloud services for genome data storage due to the huge volume of genome datasets [60]. Some
cloud services, such as Google Genomics [33] and Amazon [5], have also set up specific platforms for
organizing and analyzing genome information. With deduplication, the storage of genome data can be
significantly reduced, for example, by 83% in real deployment [48]. However, some genome datasets, such
as those produced by disease sequencing projects, are potentially identifiable and must be protected. Thus,
dataset owners must properly protect the deduplicated genome data with encryption and multiple dimensions
of access control [47]. When a researcher leaves a genome project, it is necessary to revoke the researcher’s
access privilege to the genome data.
Rekeying can be used to revoke users’ access rights by re-encrypting ciphertexts (e.g., the genome data
in the previous example) with new keys and making old keys inactive. There are two revocation approaches
for existing stored data [10]: (i) lazy revocation, in which re-encryption of a stored file is deferred until the
next update to the file, and (ii) active revocation, in which the stored files are immediately re-encrypted with
the new key for up-to-date protection, at the expense of incurring additional performance overheads.
2.3 Challenges
Enabling rekeying in encrypted deduplication storage is a non-trivial issue. MLE keys are often derived
from messages via a global key derivation function, such as a hash function in CE [28] or a keyed pseudo-
random function in DupLESS [13]. A straightforward rekeying approach is to update the key derivation
function directly. However, this approach compromises deduplication. Specifically, a new message cannot
be deduplicated with the existing identical message, because the messages are now encrypted with different
MLE keys that are derived from different derivation functions. If we re-encrypt all existing messages with
new MLE keys, the re-encryption overhead will be significant due to the high volume of stored data.
There are other possible rekeying approaches, but we argue that they have limitations. One approach is
based on layered encryption [6,53]. Each deduplicated message is first encrypted with its MLE key, and the
MLE key is further encrypted with a master key associated with each user. The security now builds on the
master key. Rekeying can simply be done by updating the master key, and re-encrypting the MLE key with
the new master key. This approach does not change the MLE key, so any new message can be deduplicated
with the existing identical message. Its drawback is that every ciphertext remains encrypted by the same
MLE key. If an MLE key is leaked, then the corresponding message can be identified. Another approach
is proxy re-encryption [9], which transforms a ciphertext encrypted with an old key into another ciphertext
encrypted with a new key. However, proxy re-encryption is a public-key primitive and is inefficient when
encrypting large-size messages.
3 Overview
REED is a rekeying-aware encrypted deduplication storage system designed for a single enterprise or orga-
nization in which multiple users want to outsource storage to a remote third-party cloud provider. It deploys
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Figure 1: REED architecture.
a remote server to run deduplication on the storage workloads, and stores the unique data after deduplication
in the cloud provider. We target the workloads that have high content similarity, such as backup or genome
data (Section 2.2), so that deduplication can effectively remove duplicates and improve storage efficiency.
REED aims to achieve secure and lightweight rekeying, while preserving deduplication capability. In
particular, it enables dynamic access control by controlling which group of users can access a file. It supports
both lazy and active revocations (Section 2.2); for the latter, the stored files can be re-encrypted with low
overhead.
3.1 Architecture
Figure 1 presents an overview of the architecture of REED. REED follows a client-server architecture. It is
composed of different entities, as described below.
Client: In each user machine, we deploy a REED client (or client for short) as a software layer that provides
a secure interface for a user to access and manage files in remote storage. To perform an upload operation,
the client takes a file (e.g., a snapshot of a file system folder) as an input from its co-located user machine. It
divides the file data into chunks, encrypts them, and uploads the encrypted chunks to the cloud. We assume
that the file has a sufficiently large size (e.g., GB scale), and can be divided into a large number of chunks
of small sizes (e.g., KB scale).
We support both fixed-size and variable-size chunking schemes. We implement variable-size chunking
using Rabin fingerprinting [52], which takes the minimum, maximum, and average chunk sizes as inputs.
We fix the minimum and maximum chunk sizes at 2KB and 16KB, respectively, and vary the average chunk
size in our evaluation. In file downloads, the client reassembles collected chunks into the original file.
Key manager: As in DupLESS [13], REED deploys a key manager to provide an interface for a client
to access MLE keys for encrypted storage. Each client communicates with the key manager to perform
necessary cryptographic operations. We implement server-aided MLE as in DupLESS to protect all chunks,
including predictable and unpredictable ones, as well as the OPRF-based MLE key generation protocol
(Section 2.1). We elaborate the key generation details in Section 5.1. Other approaches, such as blinded
BLS signatures [21], can be used to implement MLE key generation. This work considers a single key
manager, while our design can be generalized to multiple key managers for improved availability [29].
Server: REED performs server-side deduplication. In the cloud, we deploy a REED server (or server for
short) for storage management. The server maintains a fingerprint index that keeps track of all chunks that
have been uploaded to the cloud. For a given received chunk, the server checks by fingerprint if the chunk
has already been uploaded by the same or a different client. If the chunk is new, it stores the chunk and
inserts the chunk fingerprint to the index. We can deploy multiple servers for scalability.
Storage backend: Finally, the server stores the encrypted chunks and metadata in the storage backend of
5
the cloud. For example, if we choose Amazon’s cloud services, we can rent an EC2 virtual machine for a
REED server, and use S3 as the storage backend.
3.2 Threat Model
We consider an honest-but-curious adversary that aims to learn the content of the files in outsourced storage.
The adversary can take the following actions. First, it can compromise the cloud (including any hosted server
and the storage backend) to have full access to all stored chunks and keys. Also, it can collude with a subset
of unauthorized or revoked clients, and attempt to learn the files that are beyond the access scope of the
colluded clients. Furthermore, it can monitor the activities of the clients, identify the MLE keys returned by
the key manager, and attempt to extract the files owned by the monitored clients.
Our threat model makes the following assumptions. We assume the communication between a client
and the key manager is encrypted and authenticated (e.g., using SSL/TLS), so as to defend against any
eavesdropping activity in the network. Each client and the key manager adopt oblivious key generation [13],
so that the key manager cannot infer the fingerprint information and learn the message content. We also
assume that the key manager is deployed in a fully protected zone, and an adversary cannot compromise or
gain access to the key manager.
We do not consider the threat in which an adversary launches online brute-force attacks from a compro-
mised client against the key manager, since the key manager can rate-limit the query rate of each client [13].
REED can be deployed in conjunction with remote data checking [8,38] to efficiently check the integrity of
outsourced files against malicious corruptions. REED performs server-side deduplication to protect against
the side-channel attacks mentioned in [35, 36].
3.3 Design Goals
Given the threat model, REED focuses on the following design goals.
• Confidentiality: REED protects outsourced chunks, such that the chunk contents are kept secret
against any honest-but-curious adversary (e.g., any unauthorized user or cloud). In addition, REED
prevents revoked users from accessing any new file or update.
• Integrity: REED ensures chunk-level integrity of outsourced files. When a client downloads a chunk,
it can check if the chunk is intact or corrupted.
• Practical rekeying: REED enables rekeying and dynamic access control, such that it can control
which group of users can access a file. It supports both lazy and active revocations with low overhead;
for the latter, the stored files can be efficiently re-encrypted. REED also allows an unlimited number
of rekeying operations.
• High storage efficiency: REED achieves storage efficiency by deduplication. In addition, it intro-
duces small storage overhead due to keys or metadata.
• High encryption performance: REED introduces limited encryption overhead when compared to
the network transmission via the cloud.
4 REED Design
We now present the design details of REED. We propose two encryption schemes that trade between per-
formance and security. We also demonstrate how REED realizes dynamic access control using existing
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primitives. Finally, we analyze the security of REED. In this section, we focus on the essential features
of REED that support secure and lightweight rekeying, without considering workload characteristics; in
Section 5, we exploit similarity for performance improvements.
4.1 Main Idea
REED builds security simultaneously on two types of symmetric keys: a file-level secret key per file (or file
key for short) and a chunk-level MLE key for each chunk (or MLE key for short). During rekeying, REED
only needs to renew the file key, while the MLE keys of all chunks remain unchanged.
REED uses all-or-nothing transform (AONT) [56] as the underlying cryptographic primitive. AONT is
an unkeyed, randomized encryption mode that transforms a message into a ciphertext called the package,
which has the property that it is computationally infeasible to be reverted back to the original message with-
out knowing the entire package. The original AONT design prohibits deduplication, since its transformation
takes a random key as an input to construct a package. Thus, REED uses convergent AONT (CAONT) [43],
which replaces the random key with a deterministic message-derived key to construct a package. This
ensures that identical messages always lead to the same package.
REED augments CAONT to enable rekeying. Our insight is to achieve security by sacrificing a slight
degradation of storage efficiency. The idea of REED is based on AONT-based secure deletion [50], which
makes the entire package unrecoverable by securely removing a small part of a package. REED extends the
idea to make it applicable for rekeying. Specifically, REED generates a CAONT package with the MLE key
as an input, and encrypts a small part of the package, called the stub [50], with the file key. Thus, the entire
package is now protected by both the file key and the MLE key. The stub size is small; for example, our
implementation sets it as 64 bytes, equivalent to 0.78% for an 8KB chunk. In addition, we can still apply
deduplication to the remaining large part of the package, called the trimmed package, so as to maintain
storage efficiency.
In the following, we first design two rekeying-aware encryption schemes on a per-chunk basis (Sec-
tion 4.2), followed by enabling REED with dynamic access control on a per-file basis.
4.2 Encryption Schemes
We propose the basic and enhanced encryption schemes for REED. The basic scheme is more efficient, but
is vulnerable to the leakage of an MLE key. On the other hand, the enhanced scheme protects against the
leakage of an MLE key, while introducing an additional encryption step. In the following, we first explain
the basics of AONT [56] and its variant CAONT [43], followed by how the basic and enhanced encryption
schemes build on CAONT.
All-or-nothing transform (AONT): AONT [56] works as follows. It transforms a messageM to a package
denoted by (C, t), where C and t are called the head and tail, respectively. Specifically, it first selects a
random encryption key K and generates a pseudo-random mask G(K) = E(K,S), where E(·) denotes a
symmetric key encryption function (e.g., AES-256) and S is a publicly known block with the same size as
M . It then computes C = M ⊕ G(K), where ‘⊕’ is the XOR operator, and also computes t = H(C)⊕K,
where H(·) is the hash function (e.g., SHA-256). Note that the resulting package has a larger size than the
original message M by the size of t. To recover the original message M , suppose that the whole package
(C, t) is known. We first compute K = H(C)⊕ t, followed by computing M = C ⊕ E(K,S).
CAONT [43] follows the same paradigm of AONT, but replaces the random encryption key K by a
deterministic cryptographic hash h = H(M) derived from the message M . This ensures that packages
generated by identical messages remain identical, and hence the packages can still be deduplicated. Another
feature of CAONT is that it allows integrity checking without padding. Specifically, after the package is
reverted, the integrity can be verified by computing the hash value of M and checking if it equals h.
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Basic encryption: The basic encryption scheme leverages CAONT [43] to generate both the trimmed
package and the stub, as shown in Figure 2. In particular, we make two modifications to CAONT. The
first modification is to replace the cryptographic hash key in CAONT [43] by the corresponding MLE key
KM generated by the key manager. The rationale is that we use the MLE key to achieve security even for
predictable chunks through server-aided MLE [13] (Section 2.1). However, we now cannot use the hash key
for integrity checking as in CAONT. Thus, the second modification is to append a publicly known, fixed-size
canary c to M [55] for CAONT, so that the integrity of M can be checked. In our implementation, we set
the fixed-size canary c to be 32 bytes of zeroes.
The basic encryption scheme is detailed as follows. We first concatenate an input chunk M with the
canary c to form (M ||c), and compute the pseudo-random mask G(KM ) = E(KM , S), where KM is the
MLE key obtained from the key manager and S is the publicly known block with the same size of (M ||c).
We compute the package head C = (M ||c)⊕ G(KM ), and the package tail t = KM ⊕ H(C). We generate
the stub by trimming the last few bytes (e.g., 64 bytes) from the package (C, t), and leave the remaining part
as the trimmed package. Finally, we encrypt the stub with the file key. Reconstruction of a message works
reversely, and we omit details here.
We briefly comment on the security guarantees of the basic encryption scheme. The security of each
chunk builds on both the file key and the MLE key. If both the file key and the MLE key are secure, then
given both the trimmed package and the encrypted stub of a chunk, it is computationally infeasible to revert
them to the original chunk. In addition, if the file key is renewed, it is also computationally infeasible to
restore the stub (which is now protected by the new file key) and hence the original chunk using the old file
key.
One limitation of the basic encryption scheme is that it is vulnerable to the compromise of the MLE key.
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Specifically, an adversary can monitor the MLE keys generated by the key manager at a compromised client
(Section 3.3). If an MLE key is revealed, the adversary can recover the pseudo-random mask and XOR the
mask with the trimmed package to extract a majority part of the chunk.
Enhanced encryption: We propose the enhanced encryption scheme, which protects against the compro-
mise of its MLE key. Figure 3 shows the workflow of the enhanced encryption, which first applies MLE to
form a ciphertext, followed by applying CAONT [43] to the MLE ciphertext. The rationale is that even if
an adversary obtains the MLE key, it still cannot recover original chunk because the MLE ciphertext is now
protected by CAONT.
The enhanced encryption scheme is detailed as follows. First, we encrypt an input chunk M with the
MLE key KM as in traditional MLE, and obtain the ciphertext C1. We then transform the concatenation
C1||KM based on the original CAONT [43]. We can now use the hash key h = H(C1||KM ), instead of
the MLE key used in the basic encryption scheme, to transform the package. This eliminates the security
dependence on the MLE key. Formally, we compute the hash key h = H(C1||KM ) and the pseudo-random
mask G(h) = E(h, S), where S is a publicly known block with the same size as C1||KM , and computes the
package head C2 = (C1||KM )⊕ G(h).
Since the hash key h allows integrity checking [43], we can generate the tail t with a self-XOR operation
for efficiency [50], instead of using the cryptographic hash as in the basic encryption scheme (Figure 2).
Specifically, we evenly divide C2 into a set of fixed-size pieces, each with the same size as h. We then XOR
all the pieces as well as h to compute the tail t. Note that the self-XOR result cannot be predicted without
knowing the entire content of C2. Finally, we obtain the trimmed package and the stub from (C2, t).
To reconstruct M , we first reconstruct (C2, t) from the trimmed package and the stub. We evenly divide
C2 into fixed-size pieces, each with the same size as t, and compute h by XOR-ing the pieces and t. We
then recover C1||KM = C2 ⊕ G(h), and check the integrity by comparing H(C1||KM ) and h. We finally
compute M = D(KM , C1), where D(·) is the decryption function.
We now briefly comment on the security guarantees of the enhanced encryption scheme. As in basic
encryption, the enhanced encryption scheme ensures that each chunk remains secure if both the file key and
the MLE key are secure. If the MLE key is leaked, the adversary can recover the original chunk from the
MLE ciphertext (i.e., the input to CAONT), yet the original chunk remains secure if the unpredictability
assumption still holds (see Section 2.1). We present a more detailed security analysis in Section 4.5.
4.3 Dynamic Access Control
REED supports dynamic access control by associating each file with a policy, which provides a specifi-
cation of which users are authorized or revoked to access the file. Our policy-based design builds on two
well-known cryptographic primitives: ciphertext policy attribute-based encryption (CP-ABE) [15] and key
regression [30]. REED integrates both primitives to generate the corresponding file key, as shown in Fig-
ure 4. Note that our goal here is not to propose new designs for CP-ABE and key regression; instead, we
demonstrate how REED can work seamlessly with them to provide advanced security functionalities for
rekeying. In the following, we elaborate how REED integrates the two primitives.
Access control: REED defines policies based on CP-ABE [15]. In CP-ABE, a message is encrypted based
on a specific policy that describes which users can decrypt the message. Each policy is represented in the
form of an access tree, in which each non-leaf node represents a Boolean gate (e.g., AND or OR), while each
leaf node represents an attribute that defines or classifies some user property (e.g., the department that a user
belongs to, the employee rank, the contract duration, etc.). Each user is given a private key that corresponds
to a set of attributes. If a user’s attributes satisfy the access tree, his private key can decrypt the ciphertext.
Our current design of REED treats each attribute as a unique identifier for each user. We issue each user
with a CP-ABE private key, called the private access key, related to the identifier. We define the policy of
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each file as an access tree that connects the identifiers of all authorized users with an OR gate. Thus, any
authorized user can decrypt the ciphertext, which we use to protect the file key (see the rekeying discussion
below). Note that we can define more attributes and a more sophisticated access tree structure for better
access control.
Rekeying: REED supports both lazy and active revocations for rekeying. In lazy revocation, REED builds
on key regression [30], which is a serial key derivation scheme for generating different versions of keys.
Specifically, key regression introduces a sequence of key states, such that the current key state can derive the
previous key states, but it cannot derive any future key state. Thus, an authorized user can access all previous
key states, and the corresponding files, by using only the current key state; meanwhile, a user revoked from
the current key state cannot access any new file that is protected by a future key state. REED implements
lazy revocation using the RSA-based key regression scheme [30]. We assign each user with a unique pair
of public-private keys called the derivation keys, such that the private derivation key is used to generate new
key states for the files owned by the user, while the public derivation key is used to derive the previous key
states. The file key will be obtained by generating a cryptographic hash of the current key state. Each key
state refers to a policy, and it will be encrypted by CP-ABE associated with the authorized users. In other
words, any authorized user can retrieve the current key state, and hence the file key, with his private access
key.
REED implements active revocation following the same paradigm as in lazy revocation, except that the
files affected by active revocation are immediately re-encrypted with the new file key.
4.4 Operations
We now summarize the interactions among a client, a server, the key manager, and the storage backend in
REED operations. We focus on three basic operations, including upload, download, and rekeying.
Upload: To upload a file F , the client first picks a random key state SF and hashes it into a symmetric file
key κF . It splits F into a set of chunks {M}, computes their fingerprints, and runs the OPRF protocol [13]
with the key manager to obtain the MLE keys {KM} of these chunks (Section 3.1). For each M , it uses
KM to transform a chunk into a trimmed package and a stub, using either the basic or enhanced encryption
scheme (Section 4.2). The client writes the stubs of all the chunks of the same file into a separate stub
file for storage, and the stub file will be encrypted by the file key κF . In addition, the client generates a
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file recipe, which includes the file information such as the file pathname, file size, and the total number of
chunks. Furthermore, the client encrypts SF using CP-ABE based on the policy of the file. Finally, the
client uploads the following information to the REED server: (i) the trimmed packages and encrypted stubs
for all chunks, (ii) file recipe, and (iii) the encrypted key state SF and the metadata that includes the policy
information. Note that we do not need to upload MLE keys, as they are not used in decryption (Section 4.2).
The server performs deduplication on the received trimmed packages. All information will be stored at the
storage backend.
Download: To download a file F , the client first retrieves the encrypted key state SF and decrypts it with
the private access key. It then hashes SF to recover the file key κF . In addition, it downloads all trimmed
packages and encrypted stubs from the storage backend, with the help of the REED server and the file recipe.
It decrypts the stubs via κF , and finally reconstructs all chunks for F . Note that if the client detects any
tampered chunk, the reconstruction operation will abort.
Rekeying: To rekey F with new access privileges, the client (on behalf of the owner of F ) retrieves SF and
its metadata, and decrypts SF with the private access key. It then generates a new key state S′F based on key
regression (Section 4.3). It encrypts S′F via CP-ABE based on a new policy (e.g., with a new group of users).
It finally uploads the encrypted S′F as well as its metadata that describes the new policy information. For
active revocation, the client also downloads the stubs of F , re-encrypts them with a new file key obtained
by hashing S′F , and finally uploads the re-encrypted stubs.
4.5 Security Analysis
We now analyze the security of REED based on our security goals.
Confidentiality: We show how REED achieves confidentiality at three levels. First, an adversary can access
all trimmed packages, encrypted stubs, and encrypted key states from a compromised server. Since the
adversary cannot compromise any private access key and private derivation key, all trimmed packages and
encrypted stubs cannot be reverted. Thus, REED achieves the same level of confidentiality like DupLESS
[13] (Section 2.1).
Second, an adversary can collude with revoked or unauthorized clients, through which the adversary can
learn a set of private derivation keys and private access keys. Due to the protection of CP-ABE and key
regression, these compromised private keys cannot be used to decrypt the file key ciphertexts beyond their
access scopes. Without proper file keys, the adversary cannot infer anything about the underlying chunks.
One special note is that a client may keep the MLE key (in basic encryption) or the hash key (in enhanced
encryption) of a chunk in CAONT (Figures 2 and 3, respectively) to make the chunk accessible even after
being revoked. However, if the chunk is updated, the revoked client cannot learn any information from
the updated chunk because CAONT will use a new MLE key or hash key to transform the updated chunk,
making the old one useless.
Finally, an adversary can monitor a subset of clients and identify the MLE keys requested by them. The
enhanced encryption scheme of REED ensures confidentiality for unpredictable chunks, even though the
victim clients are authorized to access these chunks. Specifically, the enhanced encryption scheme builds an
additional security layer with the file key. As long as the file key is secure, it is computationally infeasible
to restore the MLE ciphertext (i.e., the input to CAONT) due to the protection of CAONT. Note that the
adversary may restore the MLE ciphertext by launching a brute-force attack to check if the MLE ciphertext
is transformed into the trimmed package through CAONT, but it is computationally infeasible if chunks are
unpredictable (see Section 4.2). Thus, identifying an MLE key does not help recover the original chunk, and
hence the original chunk remains secure.
Integrity: Both the basic and enhanced encryption schemes of REED ensure chunk-level integrity, such
that any modification of the trimmed package or the stub of a chunk can be detected. In the basic encryption
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scheme, the MLE key can be reverted as KM = H(C) ⊕ t (Section 4.2). Since H(C) depends on every bit
of C [66], the modification of any part of the package will lead to an incorrect KM . Thus, the client can
easily detect the modification by checking the canary padded with the reverted chunk.
Using similar reasonings, the enhanced encryption scheme also ensures the integrity of a chunk, such
that a client performs integrity checking by comparing if H(C1||KM ) equals h (Section 4.2). One special
note regarding the enhanced scheme is that its use of the self-XOR operation may return a correct hash key
h even if the package is tampered. For example, an intelligent adversary can divide C2 into fixed-size pieces
and flip the same bit position for an even number of the pieces. On the other hand, a tampered package
will be reverted to a wrong input even with the correct hash key, and its integrity violation can be caught by
comparing it with h.
4.6 Discussion
We present some open issues of our current REED design.
Fault tolerance: In this work, we do not explicitly address fault tolerance. To improve fault tolerance
of stored data, we can distribute both trimmed packages and stubs across multiple cloud providers via
deduplication-aware secret sharing [43].
Metadata management: We currently focus on the encryption and rekeying for file chunks, while we do
not address those for file metadata (e.g., file recipe). We can obfuscate sensitive metadata information, such
as the file pathname, by encoding it via a salted hash function.
Group-based file management: We currently perform rekeying on a per-file basis. We can generalize
rekeying for file group with multiple files. This makes file management more flexible. On the other hand,
we need to define new metadata to describe the file group information.
5 Exploiting Similarity
REED builds on server-aided MLE key generation [13], in which the key manager generates an MLE key
for each message (or chunk in our case). In this section, we argue that MLE key generation is expensive and
significantly degrades the overall performance of REED. In view of this, we propose to exploit the similarity
feature that is commonly found in backup workloads, so as to mitigate the performance overhead of REED.
5.1 Overhead of MLE Key Generation
Recall that REED realizes the OPRF protocol to “blind” MLE key generation as in DupLESS [13]. In our
design, we configure the key manager with a system-wide public/private key pair, based on 1024-bit RSA
in our case. Let e and d be the public and private keys, respectively, and N be the modulus. For each chunk
to be uploaded, a client performs MLE key generation in the following steps (note that all arithmetic is
performed in modulo N ).
• Blind: the client selects a random number r, raises it to power e, and multiplies re with the fingerprint.
It sends the blinded fingerprint to the key manager.
• Sign: the key manager computes an RSA signature by raising the blinded fingerprint to power d. It
returns the result to the client. Note that the key manager does not know the original fingerprint, which
is “blinded” by the random number r.
• Unblind: the client multiplies the received result with the inverse of r. It also hashes the unblinded
result to form the MLE key.
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Table 1: Performance breakdown of MLE key generation for an 8KB chunk.
Steps Latency (µs)
Blind (performed by the client) 46.3
Sign (performed by the key manager) 537.2
Unblind (performed by the client) 246.9
Round-trip transmission 294.9
OPRF-based MLE key generation is expensive, especially when it operates on small-size chunks. Its
overhead comes from two aspects. First, if a client sends individual per-chunk MLE key generation requests
to the key manager, there will be substantial transmission overhead. Also, since the OPRF protocol for key
generation is based on public key cryptography, there will be substantial computational overhead due to
modular exponentiation.
Table 1 provides a performance breakdown (in terms of latency) of MLE key generation for an 8KB
chunk. We obtain average results over 10 runs from our experimental testbed (Section 7). If we implement
all the steps serially, the total latency for MLE key generation is 1125.3µs, or equivalently the throughput
is only 8KB1125.3µs ≈ 6.9MB/s. If we deploy REED in a Gigabit LAN (our experimental testbed), MLE key
generation easily becomes a performance bottleneck of REED. In particular, the sign operation occupies
48% of the total latency, and it cannot be trivially parallelized for performance improvement.
5.2 Limitations of Simple Optimizations
To mitigate MLE key generation overhead, our conference paper [42] uses two optimization approaches:
(i) batching per-chunk MLE key generation requests and (ii) caching the most recently generated MLE
keys in the client’s local key cache. While both approaches can mitigate key generation overhead based on
evaluation results, they still have the following limitations.
Batching per-chunk MLE key generation requests aims to reduce round-trip transmission overhead, but it
does not reduce computational overhead (see Table 1). As shown in our conference paper [42], batching 256
per-chunk key generation requests for 8KB chunks can only achieve a key generation speed of 17.64MB/s,
which is still much smaller than the network speed in a Gigabit LAN.
Caching the MLE keys is effective in mitigating key generation overhead, based on the observation that
the adjacent uploads of a client often share high content similarity; for example, backup snapshots for a file
system are highly similar if there are only small changes to the file system. As shown in our conference
paper [42], we can eliminate most key generation requests for the uploads of subsequent backups after
the first one, so the upload speeds for subsequent backups are almost network-bound (around 100MB/s).
However, the caching approach has few limitations. First, it is only effective for uploads that are largely
duplicated with the previous one (e.g., it is ineffective for the first backup [42]). Second, its required local
cache space is not scalable; for example, it needs 4GB of cache space per 1TB of storage, assuming that we
configure 8KB chunks and 256-bit MLE keys. Finally, it is unreliable due to the volatile nature of cache.
5.3 Similarity-based Approach
We propose a similarity-based approach for MLE key generation, such that we can mitigate MLE key
generation overhead, while preserving deduplication effectiveness. First, we adopt coarse-grained MLE
key generation on a larger data unit called segment, which comprises multiple adjacent chunks and has a
size on the order of megabytes (e.g., 1MB by default in our case). To form a segment, we implement the
variable-size segmentation scheme in [44] that operates directly on chunk fingerprints and is configured by
the minimum, average, and maximum segment sizes. Specifically, we traverse the stream of chunks, and
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Figure 5: Example of similarity-based MLE key generation.
place a segment boundary after the chunk if the chunk fingerprint modulo a pre-defined divisor is equal to
a fixed constant (which we set to -1 as in [44]). Here, the divisor is configured by the average segment
size to specify the expected number of chunks between adjacent segment boundaries. We ensure that the
segment size is at least the minimum segment size, and we always place a boundary after the chunk whose
inclusion makes the segment size larger than the maximum segment size. In our implementation, we vary
the average segment size, and fix the minimum segment size and maximum segment size as half and double
of the average segment size, respectively.
Clearly, per-segment MLE key generation incurs much fewer key generation requests than the per-
chunk one, thereby significantly mitigating the overall performance overhead. On the other hand, segment-
level MLE key generation can introduce different segment-level MLE keys for different segments (and
hence ciphertexts), even though the segments share a large portion of identical chunks. This compromises
deduplication effectiveness.
Thus, our similarity-based approach aims to maximize deduplication effectiveness by carefully gener-
ating segment-level MLE keys. Our insight is to assign “similar” segments with the same MLE key and
encrypt every chunk of a segment with the corresponding segment-level MLE key. If two “similar” seg-
ments share a large number of identical chunks, the identical chunks are still encrypted with the same key
and hence deduplicated.
In this work, we borrow the Extreme Binning approach [17] to identify similar segments. Specifically,
for each segment that contains multiple chunks, a client selects the chunk (called the representative chunk)
whose fingerprint value is the minimum. It uses the minimum fingerprint to request the key manager for the
segment-level MLE key. It then encrypts each chunk (via either basic or enhanced encryption of REED) with
the received MLE key. The rationale is that if two segments share a large number of identical chunks, there
is a high probability that both segments share the same representative chunk (due to Border’s Theorem [22]).
Figure 5 shows an example of our similarity-based approach. Consider three segments Seg1, Seg2 and
Seg3 that have four chunks each, and suppose that their representative chunks are A, D, and A, respec-
tively. Since both segments Seg1 and Seg3 share the same MLE key, their identical chunks (i.e., A, B
and C) in these similar segments can be deduplicated. Note that the approach cannot achieve exact dedu-
plication; for example, chunk D in segments Seg2 and Seg3 cannot be deduplicated due to the different
segment-level MLE keys. Nevertheless, since similarity is common in backup workloads [17], we expect
that our similarity-based approach achieves high deduplication effectiveness, as also validated in our evalu-
ation (Section 7).
5.4 Security Analysis
We now analyze the security impact of the similarity-based MLE key generation on both the basic and
enhanced encryption schemes. Unfortunately, our similarity-based key generation cannot preserve the con-
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fidentiality of chunks in the basic scheme. The reason is that it uses a segment-level MLE key (derived from
the minimum fingerprint of a segment) as an input to CAONT to transform all chunks in a segment. This
creates the same pseudo-random mask G(.) for all chunks in the same segment. This allows an adversary
to apply an XOR operation to any two of the resulting trimmed packages to remove the mask, and learn a
majority part of the XOR result of original chunks.
Nevertheless, we emphasize that the similarity-based MLE key generation does not introduce new se-
curity risks in the enhanced scheme. The reason is that the pseudo-random mask is generated from both
the MLE key and the MLE ciphertext (i.e., C1 in Figure 3). As a result, different chunks lead to different
pseudo-random masks, which are infeasible to be removed without the knowledge of the file key. Although
the similarity-based MLE key generation allows an adversary to narrow down the attack space of the on-
line brute-force attack by requesting the MLE keys for potential minimum fingerprints, the key manager can
lower the rate limit for key generation requests [13]. Since segment-level key generation has already reduced
the number of key generation requests, lowering the rate limit has no impact on normal users. Thus, the en-
hanced encryption scheme can benefit from similarity-based MLE key generation for performance gains,
and achieve similar performance to the basic encryption scheme based on our evaluation (see Section 7.1).
5.5 Summary
We summarize the benefits of our similarity-based MLE key generation over the simple optimizations in
Section 5.2. First, it operates on a per-segment basis, it inherently reduces the number of MLE key gener-
ation requests, independent of the amount of duplicates in the workloads. Also, it does not need to locally
cache MLE keys, and hence it eliminates the concerns of maintaining a large cache space. Finally, it exploits
similarity to remove duplicate chunks to maintain deduplication effectiveness.
6 Implementation
We implement a REED prototype in C++ based on our previously built system CDStore [43]. We follow the
modular approach as in CDStore to implement REED, and Figure 6 shows how the modules of REED are
organized. We mainly extend CDStore to support rekeying, with the addition of a key manager, the basic and
enhanced encryption schemes (Section 4.2), dynamic access control (Section 4.3), and the similarity-based
key generation approach (Section 5.3). We also use OpenSSL 1.0.2a [49] and CP-ABE toolkit 0.11 [16]
to implement the cryptographic operations in REED. The current REED prototype, including the original
CDStore modules, contains around 11,000 LOC.
Client: Like CDStore, a client divides an input file into fixed-size or variable-size (via Rabin fingerprinting
[52]) chunks in the chunk module. It can also reassemble collected chunks into the original file during file
download. We currently use SHA-256 to compute chunk fingerprints.
In the key module, the client runs the OPRF protocol with the key manager for generating either chunk-
based or segment-level MLE keys (see Section 5.3). In addition, it implements RSA-based key regression
[30] for generating new key states during rekeying, and protects each key state using CP-ABE [15] (via the
CP-ABE toolkit [16]).
In the encryption module, the client implements both basic and enhanced encryption schemes (and
the corresponding decryption schemes). In both encryption schemes, the client transforms a chunk into a
trimmed package and a stub through CAONT, in which we implement G(.) via AES-256 and the hash func-
tion H(.) via SHA-256 (see Section 4.2). To resist brute-force attacks on the stub yet preserving storage
efficiency, we configure the stub size as 64 bytes for each chunk. To enable integrity checking on recon-
structed chunks, we set the fixed-size canary c in both schemes to be 32 and zero bytes. The client encrypts
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Figure 6: Implementation of the REED prototype.
each stub file (that consists of stubs of the same file) with a file key hashed from the corresponding key state
via SHA-256.
The communication module is similar to that in CDStore. In this module, the client uploads (resp.
downloads) all stored data to (resp. from) the server, including the trimmed packages, the encrypted stub
file, the file metadata, the encrypted key state, and the public derivation key.
Key manager: A key manager authenticates clients’ connections via SSL/TLS. It implements the OPRF
protocol based on 1024-bit RSA, and computes an RSA signature on each incoming blinded fingerprint.
Server: A server can receive file data from multiple clients via the communication module. It performs
deduplication on the trimmed packages via the dedup module, and only stores unique trimmed packages in
the storage backend. Since a file may have a large number of trimmed packages, the server packs them in
units of containers to make storage and retrieval efficient via the container module. Like CDStore, we cap
the container size at 4MB by default.
In the index module, the server keeps track of indexing information, including the fingerprints of all
trimmed packages for deduplication, and the references to all trimmed packages and file recipes in the
storage backend for file retrieval.
Storage backend: We separate the storage into file data and key information for better management.
Specifically, we create two stores at the storage backend: (i) the data store, which stores the file data such as
file recipes, trimmed packages, stub files, and all related file metadata, and (ii) the key store, which stores the
key information such as encrypted key states. Separating the storage management of key information and
file data gives flexibility, for example, by leveraging a more robust platform for encryption key management
[46].
Optimization: To achieve reasonable performance, REED batches I/O requests, and also parallelizes the
encryption (resp. decryption) operations of uploaded (resp. downloaded) chunks via multi-threading. Here,
we only configure two threads for encryption/decryption, as our evaluation results indicate that two threads
are sufficient for achieving the required performance.
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7 Evaluation
We evaluate REED on a LAN testbed composed of multiple machines, each of which is equipped with a
quad-core 3.4GHz Intel Core i5-3570, 7200RPM SATA hard disk, and 8GB RAM, and installed with 64-bit
Ubuntu 12.04.2 LTS. All machines are connected via a 1Gb/s switch.
Our default setting of REED is as follows. We run one REED client, one key manager, and five REED
servers in different machines. We use multiple REED servers for improved scalability. In particular, four of
the five servers manage the data store, and the remaining one server manages the key store. In practice, both
the data store and the key store should be deployed in a shared storage backend (e.g., cloud storage); how-
ever, to remove the I/O overhead of accessing the shared storage backend in our evaluation, we simply have
each server store information in its local hard disk. In addition to the default setting, we describe additional
specific settings in each experiment, and also consider the case where multiple clients are involved. We
compile our programs with g++ 4.8.1 with the -O3 option. For performance tests, we present the average
results over 10 runs. We do not include the variance results in our plots, as they are generally very small in
our evaluation. In the following, we use a synthetic dataset and two real-world datasets for our evaluation.
7.1 Synthetic Data
We evaluate different REED operations through synthetic data. In particular, we evaluate how segment-level
MLE key generation mitigates overhead (Section 5). Specifically, we generate a 2GB file of synthetic data
with globally unique chunks (i.e., the chunks have no duplicate content). Before each experiment, we load
the synthetic data into memory to avoid generating any disk I/O overhead.
Experiment A.1 (MLE key generation performance): We first measure the performance of MLE key
generation between a client and the key manager. The client creates chunks of the input 2GB file using
variable-size chunking based on Rabin fingerprinting with a specified average chunk size. We also group the
chunks into variable-size segments with a specified average segment size (Section 5). The client computes
the minimum fingerprint of each segment and requests for segment-level MLE keys from the key manager.
We measure the MLE key generation speed, defined as the ratio of the file size (i.e., 2GB) to the total time
starting from when the client creates the input file until it obtains all segment-level MLE keys from the key
manager.
Figure 7(a) shows the MLE key generation speed versus the average chunk size, in which we fix the
average segment size as 1MB. We observe that the speed increases with the average chunk size, mainly be-
cause we process fewer chunks to find the minimum fingerprint for each segment. When the average chunk
size is at least 8KB, the key generation speed becomes steady at around 168MB/s, since the key manager is
now saturated by segment-level key generation requests and the speed is bounded by the computation of the
key manager. For comparison, our conference paper [42] shows a per-chunk key generation speed is below
20MB/s.
Figure 7(b) shows the MLE key generation speed versus the average segment size, in which we fix the
average chunk size as 8KB. The speed increases with the average segment size, as a larger segment size
implies fewer MLE keys to be generated. When the segment size is at least 512KB, the key generation
speed is above 130MB/s, which is higher than the network speed in our LAN testbed (i.e., 1Gb/s).
Experiment A.2 (Encryption performance): We measure the performance of both basic and enhanced
encryption schemes. Suppose that the client has created chunks with variable-size chunking and obtained
MLE keys from the key manager. Here, we measure the encryption speed, defined as the ratio of the file
size (i.e., 2GB) to the total time of encrypting all chunks into trimmed packages and stubs.
Figure 8 shows the speeds of both basic and enhanced encryption schemes versus the average chunk
size (note that the average segment size has no impact on the encryption speed). The throughput of both en-
cryption schemes increases with the average chunk size, mainly because fewer chunks need to be processed.
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Figure 7: Experiment A.1 (MLE key generation performance).
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Figure 8: Experiment A.2 (Encryption performance).
The basic scheme is faster than the enhanced scheme, as the enhanced scheme introduces an additional en-
cryption (see Section 4.2). For example, for the average chunk size 8KB, the basic scheme has 203MB/s,
24% faster than 155MB/s in the enhanced scheme. We observe that the encryption speeds of both schemes
are higher than the network speed (i.e., 1Gb/s), and hence the encryption speed is not the performance
bottleneck in REED. We further justify this claim in Experiment A.3.
Experiment A.3 (Upload and download performance): We now measure the upload and download per-
formance of REED. For performance comparisons, we also include the basic encryption scheme, although
it is shown to be insecure in similarity-based MLE key generation (see Section 5.4). We first consider the
case of a single client. The client first uploads a 2GB file of unique data, followed by downloading the 2GB
file. We measure the upload speed as the ratio of the file size to the total time of sending all file data to the
servers (including the chunking, key generation, encryption, and data transfer), and the download speed as
the ratio of the file size to the total time starting from when the client issues a download request until all
original data is recovered.
Figure 9(a) shows the upload speeds under both encryption schemes versus the average chunk size, in
which we fix the average segment size as 1MB. We see that the upload speeds increase with the average
chunk size, and become close to the effective network speed in our LAN testbed. For example, when the
average chunk size is 16KB, the upload speeds for the basic and enhanced schemes are 107.6MB/s and
106.9MB/s, respectively. Both encryption schemes have only minor performance differences.
Figure 9(b) shows the upload speeds under both encryption schemes versus the average segment size, in
which we fix the average chunk size as 8KB. Similar to Figure 9(a), the upload speeds grow with the average
segment size and are finally bounded by the network speed. For example, when the average segment size is
1MB, the upload speeds for the basic and enhanced schemes are 106.9MB/s and 106.4MB/s respectively.
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Figure 9: Experiment A.3 (Upload and download performance).
Figure 9(c) shows the download speeds under both encryption schemes versus the average chunk size.
When the average chunk size goes beyond 8KB, the download speeds of both encryption schemes (e.g.,
108.0MB/s for basic encryption and 106.6MB/s for enhanced encryption) approximate the effective network
speed.
We also consider the case with multiple REED clients. We vary the number of clients from one to eight,
and each client runs on a different machine. Here, we focus on the aggregate upload performance under the
enhanced encryption scheme, such that each client uploads a 2GB file of unique data simultaneously. We
measure the aggregate upload speed, defined as the ratio of the total amount of file data (i.e., 2GB times the
number of clients) to the total time when all uploads are finished. Figure 9(d) shows the aggregate upload
speed versus the number of clients, in which we fix the average chunk size as 8KB and average segment size
as 1MB. We see that the speed increases with the number of clients, and is finally bounded by the network
bandwidth. When there are eight clients, the aggregate upload speed reaches 373.3MB/s.
Experiment A.4 (Rekeying performance): We measure the rekeying performance in both lazy and active
revocation schemes. Recall that the rekeying operation of REED requires a CP-ABE decryption with the
original policy and another CP-ABE encryption with a new policy. REED treats each policy as an access tree
with an OR gate connecting all the authorized user identifiers (see Section 4.3). This implies that the CP-
ABE decryption time is constant [15], while its encryption time grows with the number of authorized users
in the new policy. Thus, we focus on evaluating the impact of three parameters in the rekeying operation:
(i) total number of users, i.e., the number of authorized users in the original policy; (ii) revocation ratio, the
percentage of the number of users to be revoked and removed from the access tree; and (iii) file size, the size
of the rekeyed file. We measure the rekeying delay, defined as the total time of performing all rekeying steps
including: downloading and decrypting a key state, deriving a new key state, encrypting and uploading the
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Figure 10: Experiment A.4 (Rekeying performance).
new key state, and re-encrypting the stub file (for active revocation only).
Figure 10(a) shows the rekeying delay versus the total number of users, while we fix the rekeyed file
size at 2GB and the revocation ratio at 20%. The rekeying delays of both revocation schemes increase with
the total number of users, mainly because the CP-ABE encryption overhead increases with a larger access
tree. Nevertheless, the rekeying delays are within three seconds in both revocation schemes. In particular,
lazy revocation is faster than active revocation by about 0.6s, as it defers re-encryption process to the next
file update.
Figure 10(b) shows the rekeying delay versus the revocation ratio, while we fix the rekeyed file size at
2GB and the total number of users at 500. With a larger revocation ratio, the new policy has fewer authorized
users, thereby reducing the revocation time. When the revocation ratio is 50%, the rekeying delays of the
lazy and active revocation schemes are 1.44s and 2s, respectively.
Figure 10(c) shows the rekeying delay versus the size of the rekeyed file, while we fix the total number of
users at 500 and the revocation ratio at 20%. The rekeyed file size has no impact on lazy revocation, in which
the rekeying delay is kept at 2.25s. For active revocation, as the file size increases, it spends more time for
transferring and re-encrypting the stub file. Thus, the rekeying delay increases, for example, to 3.4s for an
8GB file. Nevertheless, if we compare the rekeying delay of active revocation with the time of transferring
a whole file in the network (e.g., at least 64s in a 1Gb/s network), the rekeying delay is insignificant. Thus,
the rekeying operation in REED is lightweight in general.
7.2 Real-world Data
We now consider two real-world datasets to drive our evaluations.
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• FSL: This dataset is collected by the File systems and Storage Lab (FSL) at Stony Brook University
[1, 62]. The original FSL dataset contains daily backups of the home directories of various users
in a shared file system. We focus on the Fslhomes dataset in 2013, which comprises 147 daily
snapshots from January 22 to June 17, 2013. Each snapshot represents a daily backup, represented
by a collection of 48-bit fingerprints of variable-size chunks with an average 8KB chunk size. The
dataset we consider accounts for a total of 56.20TB of pre-deduplicated data.
• VM: This dataset consists of virtual machine (VM) image snapshots and is collected by ourselves.
We have 156 VMs for students enrolling in a university programming course in Spring 2014. We take
26 full image daily snapshots for each VM spanning over three months. Each image snapshot is of
size 10GB, and the complete dataset contains 39.61TB of data. Each daily snapshot is represented in
SHA-1 fingerprints on 4KB fixed-size chunks. We remove all zero-filled chunks that are known to
dominate in VM images [37], and the size reduces to 18.24TB. A subset of the same dataset is also
used in the prior work [43].
In our evaluation, we construct variable-size segments with the average segment size 1MB by grouping
the chunks specified in the datasets (i.e., the variable-size chunks in FSL and the fixed-size chunks in VM),
based on variable-size segmentation [44] described in Section 5.
Experiment B.1 (Storage overhead): We first measure the storage overhead due to REED. Our goal is to
show that REED still maintains storage efficiency via deduplication, even though it can only deduplicate part
of a chunk (i.e., trimmed package). We define three types of data: (i) logical data, the original data before
any encryption or deduplication; (ii) stub data, the encrypted stub files being stored; (iii) physical data, the
trimmed packages being stored after deduplication. We aggregate the data from all users and measure the
total size of each data type.
Figure 11(a) shows the cumulative data sizes over the number of days of storing FSL daily backups of
all users. Each FSL daily backup contains 290-680GB of logical data for all users, yet the physical and stub
data that REED actually stores after deduplication accounts for only 6.56GB per day on average. After 147
days, there is a total of 57,548GB of logical data, and REED generates only 964.4GB of physical and stub
data after deduplication. It achieves a total saving of 98.3%. This shows that we still maintain high storage
efficiency through deduplication.
Figure 11(b) compares the cumulative sizes of physical and stub data after deduplication. The cumu-
lative size of stub data increases over days. After 147 days, there are 584.3GB of physical data due to the
unique trimmed packages. There is also 380.1GB of stub data. Note that the stub data cannot be dedupli-
cated as it is encrypted by a renewable file key. Nevertheless, deduplication effectively reduces the overall
storage space according to Figure 11(a).
We now switch to the VM dataset. Figure 11(c) compares the size of logical data with the sizes of
physical and stub data. After 26 daily backups, we have a total of 18,681GB of logical data. Deduplication
reduces the space to 539.8GB for both physical data and stub data. The storage saving is 97.1%. Figure 11(d)
presents a breakdown. We observe that the size of stub data grows linearly with the number of daily backups.
The reason is that the stub data size depends on the number of logical chunks, yet each VM daily backup has
a similar number of logical chunks (excluding the zero-filled chunks). After 26 days, REED stores 247.9GB
of physical data and 291.9GB of stub data. The findings are similar to those for the FSL dataset.
We further compare the storage overhead of our similarity-based approach with that of the original
chunk-based approach, which performs deduplication at the granularity of chunks (8KB for FSL and 4KB
for VM). Table 2 shows the sizes of the physical and stub data, as well as the storage savings over the original
size of logical data. Our similarity-based approach mitigates the MLE key generation overhead of the chunk-
based approach, while incurring 35.3% and 45.8% more size of physical data. Note that deduplication does
not change the total number of logical chunks, so both approaches have the same size of stub data for each
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Figure 11: Experiment B.1 (Storage overhead).
Table 2: Sizes of physical and stub data using different deduplication approaches.
Data Chunk-based Similarity-based
FSL
Physical 431.9GB 584.3GB
Stub 380.1GB
Storage saving 98.6% 98.3%
VM
Physical 170.0GB 247.9GB
Stub 291.9GB
Storage saving 97.5% 97.1%
dataset. Nevertheless, the similarity-based approach still achieves almost identical storage savings for both
datasets as the chunk-based approach.
REED focuses on maintaining high storage savings for logical data via deduplication, yet we observe
that stub data becomes dominant in physical storage as more backups are stored (or more generally, for
workloads with high deduplication savings). To mitigate the storage overhead of the stub data, one option
is to increase the chunk size; in fact, it has been shown that a larger chunk size may achieve higher effective
storage savings by reducing metadata overhead [62]. We pose this issue as future work.
Experiment B.2 (Trace-driven upload and download performance): We evaluate upload and download
speeds of a single REED client using both real-world datasets, as opposed to synthetic dataset in Experi-
ment A.3. Since both FSL and VM datasets only include chunk fingerprints and chunk sizes, we reconstruct
a chunk by repeatedly writing its fingerprint to a spare chunk until reaching the specified chunk size; this
ensures that the same (resp. distinct) fingerprint returns the same (resp. distinct) chunk. The reconstructed
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Figure 12: Experiment B.2 (Trace-driven upload and download performance).
chunk is treated as the output of chunking module of the REED client. Thus, we do not include the chunking
time in this experiment.
The client uploads all daily backups (on behalf of all users), followed by downloading them. Due to the
large dataset, we only run part of the dataset to reduce the evaluation time. Specifically, for the FSL dataset,
we choose seven consecutive daily backups for nine users, totaling 3.64TB of data before deduplication; for
the VM dataset, we choose four daily backups for all users, totaling 2.78TB of data before deduplication.
We use the same setting as in Experiment A.3, and use the enhanced encryption scheme.
Figure 12 shows the upload and download speeds of REED over days. Both the upload and download
speeds of all days are almost network-bound (around 105MB/s for both datasets) due to our segment-level
MLE key generation. We highlight that for our original implementation in the conference paper [42] the
upload speed of the first day is as low as 13.1MB/s, since it lacks cached MLE keys and has to request MLE
keys for each chunk from the key manager. Our similarity-based MLE key generation does not have this
limitation.
8 Related Work
Encrypted deduplication storage: Section 2 reviews MLE [14] and DupLESS [13], which address the
theoretical and applied aspects of encrypted deduplication storage, respectively. Bellare et al. [14] propose a
theoretical framework of MLE, and provide formal definitions of privacy and tag consistency. The follow-up
studies [2, 12] further examine message correlation and parameter dependency of MLE.
On the applied side, convergent encryption (CE) [28] has been implemented and experimented in var-
ious storage systems (e.g., [4, 6, 23, 57, 61, 67]). DupLESS [13] implements server-aided MLE. Duan [29]
improves the robustness of key management in DupLESS via threshold signature [58]. Zheng et al. [69]
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propose a layer-level strategy specifically for video deduplication. Liu et al. [45] propose a password-
authenticated key exchange protocol for MLE key generation. ClearBox [7] enables clients to verify the
effective storage space that their data occupies after deduplication. SecDep [70] leverages cross-user file-
level deduplication on the client side to mitigate the key generation overhead, but it is susceptible to side
channel attacks, in which a malicious user can infer the existence of files through the deduplication pat-
tern [35, 36, 43]. CDStore [43] realizes CE in existing secret sharing algorithms by replacing the embedded
random seed with a message-derived hash to construct shares. REED focuses on the applied aspect, and
complements the above designs by enabling rekeying in encrypted deduplication storage.
Rekeying: Abdalla et al. [3] rigorously analyze key-derivation methods, in which a sequence of subkeys is
derived from a shared master key so as to extend the lifetime of the master key for secure communication.
Follow-up studies examine key derivation (in either key rotation or key regression) in content distribution
networks [10, 30, 39] and cloud storage [51]. A recent work [65] examines ciphertext re-encryption using
an approach similar to REED, in that it performs AONT on files and updates a small piece from the AONT
package, yet it does not consider deduplication and has no prototype that demonstrates the applicability.
REED differs from the above approaches by addressing the rekeying problem in encrypted deduplication
storage. REED also uses the key regression scheme [30] in key derivation to enable lazy revocation.
REED is related to secure deletion (see detailed surveys [26, 54]), which ensures that securely deleted
data is permanently inaccessible by anyone. Secure deletion can be achieved through cryptographic deletion
(e.g., [20, 50]), which securely erases keys in order to make encrypted data unrecoverable. REED builds on
the AONT-based cryptographic deletion [50] and preserves deduplication effectiveness. It further allows
efficient dynamic access control.
Access control: Cryptographic primitives have been proposed for enabling access control on encrypted
storage, such as broadcast encryption [19], proxy re-encryption [9], and ABE [34]. REED builds on CP-
ABE [15] to implement fine-grained access control for encrypted deduplication storage.
Exploiting workload characteristics: Some studies address deduplication performance by exploiting
workload characteristics, including chunk locality [41, 71], similarity [17, 27, 31, 44] and a combination
of both [68]. REED is motivated from a security perspective, and uses the similarity-based approach in
Extreme Binning [17] to mitigate MLE key generation overhead.
9 Conclusion
We present REED, an encrypted deduplication storage system that aims for secure and lightweight rekeying.
The core rekeying design of REED is to renew a key of a deterministic all-or-nothing-transform (AONT)
package. We propose two encryption schemes for REED: the basic scheme has higher encryption perfor-
mance, while the enhanced scheme is resilient against key leakage. We extend REED with dynamic access
control by integrating both CP-ABE and key regression primitives. We show the confidentiality and integrity
properties of REED under our security definitions. Furthermore, we propose a similarity-based approach
to mitigate MLE key generation overhead of REED. We finally implement a REED prototype, and conduct
trace-driven evaluation in a LAN testbed to demonstrate its performance and storage efficiency. In future
work, we plan to address the open issues of our current REED design (see Section 4.6), investigate how
we mitigate the storage overhead of stub data (see Section 7.2), and evaluate how REED performs for other
storage workloads.
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